Beyond Hot Money: Brokered Deposits and Bank Funding Stability.
With
Andreas Fuster
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 26-22
Abstract:
Postcrisis work on bank funding emphasizes stability risks from wholesale (uninsured) liabilities, contrasting them with stable core deposits. Many U.S. banks also rely on non-core insured funding—especially brokered deposits (BD)—which supervisors and analysts often associate with risk-taking and run-proneness. We test the latter. In sharp contrast to the "hot-money" view, BD funding remains available and scales in systemwide stress episodes, including the 2008–09 crisis and the 2023 banking turmoil, and serves as a source of liquidity for vulnerable banks facing uninsured outflows. Yet banks with higher BD shares appear more fragile on outcomes—sharper wholesale outflows and weaker equity performance in shocks. We reconcile these facts by showing that the adverse outcomes are concentrated among institutions that
increased BD reliance on the eve of the turmoil. The evidence is consistent with self-selection and signaling effects. While our findings alleviate run-fragility concerns, the non-selective access to BD during stress (weak market discipline) reinforces concerns about risk-taking incentives and potential "gambling for resurrection."